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ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM SPOLIATION OR
RELATED CONDUCT'
JOHN MacARTHUR MAGUIRE* and ROBERT C. VINCENTt
I
Introductory Analysis
T HE extreme importance of admissions and confessions in trial work
needs no emphasis. Every lawyer knows it, and every volume of
reports bespeaks it. But the present discussion demands a careful
classification of admissions, and we must therefore define our topic. If a
defendant says: "I owe the plaintiff one hundred dollars," we have an
express admission of what may be called the direct type. If the same
defendant's duly authorized agent' says to plaintiff: "My principal owes
you one hundred dollars," we again have an express admission, but this
time of the vicarious type. If plaintiff says to defendant: "You owe me
one hundred dollars," and defendant says "Yes" or nods his head, our
admission is still express, but now adoptive in form.' We probably get
into the realm of implied admissions with evidence that the defendant,
charged by plaintiff with owing the latter one hundred dollars, simply
stood mute. We certainly get there with evidence that defendant tore
out of his books and burned the pages showing the state of his account
with plaintiff.4
*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
IMember of the Massachusetts Bar.
1. Our title sufficiently indicates that we are commenting upon part of a larger topic
already subjected to profound analysis in 1 WloMOR ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 265
et seq. Without laying claim to originality, we hope that narrower examination from
a slightly different angle of approach may prove helpful. Our reasons for selecting this
particular part of the general topic are indicated in the text. 2 CXAmBIIERLAYNE ON Evi-
DENCE (1911) §§ 1070b, 1070c, 1075a, 1075c, 1076a, 1077a, and 1078a, should also be scru-
tinized. Despite differences in language, we are obviously in debt to his thought.
2. For definition of "duly authorized" in this connection see RFSTATEMENT, Aomcv
(1933) §§ 286, 287.
3. As to this last term see Maguire, Adoptive Admissions in Massachusetts (1929) 14
MAss. L. Q. 62. Wigmore considers adoptive admission vicarious. 2 WIoGMoRE ON EvInaNCu
(2d ed. 1923) § 1052 (2).
4. The difficulty in setting this transition point is probably more apparent than real.
Wigmore says that where silence is "equivalent to an assent to the assertion" of another,
it "fixes the party, by adoption, with the other person's assertion, and thus it ceases to
be a question of conduct-evidence, and involves a genuine admission in express words,"
1 WIGMORE ON EvlDNvcE (2d ed. 1923) § 292 [with cross-references to which may be added
§ 1052 (2)]. This might be taken to mean that an admission is "implied" only when not
explicitly framed in words. We are more attracted to a view that an admission should be
called "express" when it is an intentional manifestation of a proposition of fact or opin-
ion; and should be called "implied" when inferred by the auditor or observer from words
or conduct not intended as such a manifestation. Even this definition may not be fully
acceptable. Fortunately, we can get along without being utterly meticulous.
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While suppression of evidence is the typical illustration of "spoliation",
probably forming the most common basis of the implied admissions
which concern us, and thus the foundation of our earlier discussion,
many other bases are recognized and require scrutiny. Among these
are transfers of property to avoid attachment or execution; flight or con-
cealment to escape arrest or trial; evasive, misleading, or false utter-
ances to influence opponents' actions; fabrication of evidence, suborna-
tion of perjury, or perjury itself; intimidation of witnesses, opponents,
jurors, or judges; in sum, all sorts of actions calculated to impede or
pervert the judicial process. Our titie is meant to show that we are
seeking only the evidentiary consequences, if any, attributed to such
obstructionism. It is not inevitable or indeed always conceded in prac-
tice that there should be such consequences. The Supreme Court of
Washington suggested purely punitive treatment for a hypothetical
attempt to suppress testimony: "A substantial fine for contempt is
usually held to be sufficient to compensate an offense against the maxim
'Oinnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem', and the offended dignity of
the court."5 By way of adverse comment upon this dictum, why not
distinct concern for the offended pocketbook of the opposing litigant?
Even if the threat or actuality of contempt proceedings does keep mis-
creants in the strait and narrow path as a rule, it furnishes no direct
relief to the distressed opponent of a hardened deviator. More than
that, many types of obstructionism are considered legitimate or at least
insufficiently noxious to offend the "dignity of the court", and therefore
run no peril of judicial lightning. A litigant who discreetly refrained
from taking the stand or duly claimed privilege against self-incrimina-
tion would certainly receive no chastisement. To go even further, we
suppose that except in consequence of statute a party would be neither
imprisoned nor fined for destroying his account books or his copy of a
written contract, at least if he acted before service of process.
Certain it is that courts have not contented themselves with merely
punitive process in handling obstructionists. They have vigorously
entered the compensatory or remedial field by multiplying devices for
direct aid of persons against whom suppression and the like are prac-
ticed. Here again, careful distinction is in order. Our inquiry covers
part only of the area which such devices occupy. We confine ourselves
as narrowly as may be to discussing probative utilization. Relaxation
of exclusionary principles to help a hampered party make his case may
counter his opponent's spoliation, but does not belong to our topic.
Placement of burdens of proof of spoliators and the like does not directly
concern us.6 These are rules about evidence and not evidence itself.
S. Langley v. Devlin, 95 Wash. 171, 185, 163 Pac. 395, 400 (1917).
6. A recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States indicates that this
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To a degree, the same may be said as to the erection of presumptions to
aid obstructionists' opponents.7 But the judges constantly talk about
"presumptions" in the instant connection when they really mean "per-
missible inferences."18  Since inference is the warp and woof of our
topic, we are thus driven to quote presumption language which we regard
as spurious.9
While this stakes out boundaries of discussion, it is also necessary to
say something about possible variations of evidentiary force attributable
to implied admissions, or indeed admissions of any sort. The funda-
mental concepts to be regarded are most commonly illustrated by the
expressions "substantive evidence" and "impeaching evidence". Elab-
orating upon the hypothetical case already suggested, suppose plaintiff
declares that in consideration of the delivery of certain goods defendant
promised to pay him one hundred dollars and that the goods were duly
delivered, but the price not paid. Plaintiff testifies to the agreement.
Delivery, however, was entrusted to plaintiff's agent A, and A is unavail-
able. Plaintiff calls W, who testifies that after the alleged date of deliv-
ery defendant said: "I have plaintiff's goods and owe him one hundred
dollars for them". Defendant, testifying in his own behalf, denies both
agreement and delivery. If an admission be given substantive effect, the
judge may send the case to the jury with an instruction that W's
evidence, if it be believed, will justify although not require a finding
of delivery. If evidence of an admission be regarded only as impeach-
ing, the appropriate instruction becomes that the jury must appraise
defendant's testimony and, in doing so, may consider the admission as a
factor to drop the value of that testimony toward or to zero. But of
highly et~ective thumb screw must be used with a canny eye on constitutionality. Morri-
son v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1934), noted in (1934) 22 CAL. L. REv. 420; (1934) 48
HAv. L. REv. 102; (1934) 18 MINN. L. REv. 876; and (1934) 8 So. CAL. L. REV. 136;
a=ud discussed by Morgan, Federal Constitutional Linitations Upon Presumptions Created
by State Legislation, HARVARD LEGAL EssAYs (1934) 323, 346 et seq.
7. It is perhaps not entirely superfluous to remark in passing that the problem of
effectively disentangling "burden of proof" and "presumptions" is still much alive. For a
penetrating analysis and valuable practical suggestions see Morgan, Instructing the Jury
Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1933) 47 Hv. L. REV. 59.
8. MiAYER, PRELI=ARY T.AFTiSE (1898) 317, thus puts the distinction: "A rule of
presumption does not merely say that such and such a thing is a permissible and usual
inference from other facts, but it goes on to say that this significance shall always, In the
absence of other circumstances, be imputed to them,--sometimes passing first through the
stage of saying that it ought to be imputed." Largely because of Thayer's influence, the
modern tendency is toward precise differentiation. See, for instance, the clean-cut tall- in
Starkweather v. Conner, 38 P. (2d) 311, 314 (Ariz. 1934). But much of our material
comes from old-time cases.
9. Moreover, one essential of the valid presumption is equally necessary to the true
inference-namely, reasonable logical connection between foundation or starting point
and conclusion or terminal point. See the quotation from Thayer in the preceding note;
also pp. 233 and 244, infra.
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course under this hypothesis the judge would never get around to giving
such an instruction, because plaintiff's complete failure to furnish sub-
stantive evidence of delivery necessitates a directed verdict against him.
The admission might also have a third possible evidentiary effect,
the converse of impeachment. Change the factual hypothesis by assum-
ing the agent A available; let plaintiff, defendant, and W testify as out-
lined above; and let A also testify that he delivered the goods. Now
plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury even if the admission evidence be
given no general substantive effect. The judge may use the suggested
instruction about impeachment. Further, he may conceivably tell the
jury that they must appraise the testimony of plaintiff and A, and, in
doing so, may consider the admission as a factor tending to maintain
the value of that testimony at or near one hundred per cent. This idea
is somewhat novel, but far from unprecedented. Under appropriate
conditions, for example, the party calling a primary witness may call
auxiliary witnesses to testify. to his good reputation for truth and
veracity, the aim being to persuade the jury to give the testimony of the
primary witness its full face value. Such auxiliary testimony is usually
called rehabilitating evidence, because considered inadmissible until some
attack has been made upon the credibility of the primary witness. The
term, rehabilitation does not aptly suggest the proposed employment of
the admission now under discussion. Another and perhaps closer an-
alogy is found in cases and statutes admitting evidence of prior state-
ments or action by a witness consistent with his present testimony.'0
This is often spoken of as self-corroboration. What we are immedi-
ately discussing is corroboration by an opponent. Whether or not the
concept involves attribution of some "substantive" value to the admis-
sion is debatable. The reader will observe, though, a definite top limit
to the aggregate value of the admission and the testimony of the cor-
roborated witness-one hundred percent of such testimony's optimum
reasonable weight. For lack of an existing term in common employ-
ment, we propose to call this conceivable effect of an admission "limited
confirmation" as contrasted on one side with mere impeachment and on
the other with unlimited or general substantive use. This new interme-
diate phrase seems to epitomize the legal consequence groped for by
frequent talk of "strengthening the offended party's case" with evidence
of his opponent's obstructionism. The concept is that such reinforce-
ment may make proper the submission to jurors of an issue which would
otherwise be kept from them, or enable a verdict to stand which should
otherwise be set aside. We cannot claim that existing opinions precisely
10. Of course this represents an abnormal or minority view. It has, however, been
stoutly defended on principle in appropriate situations. See citations and quotations in
MoRGAN ArND MAGun, CAsEs ox EviENacE (1934) 120 n. 1 and 124 n. 3.
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state this concept, but the results of many cases are consistent with its
acceptance.
Now until quite recently some great legal scholars asserted that, by
and large, prior contradictory statements by witnesses and admissions
by litigants had fundamentally identical effect-impeachment alone.,'
Little was said of the effect we have dubbed confirming,12 but substan-
tive effect was distinctly challenged. Nowadays it is recognized beyond
doubt that express admissions do have substantive value on the merits."
There is, however, marked diversity of language and results as to the
evidentiary significance of implied admissions, and confusion is particu-
larly apparent where obstruction of full and free judicial inquiry fur-
nishes the basis for these inferences. This uncertainty can scarcely be
traced to qualms of conscience over the hearsay rule. Laying aside the
extreme argument that unintentional implications are not hearsay at
all,14 we are safe in pointing out that they are less unreliable than inten-
tional expressions in the form of express admissions, because there need
be no worry about the sincerity of the declarant or actor. A search of
other doctrines than hearsay is necessary to unearth the distinctions now
sought.
As a whole, the published opinions are most unsatisfactory. After
reading some scores of them, we concluded that any "collection of the
authorities" would be an uninformative hodge-podge.1' The typical case
vaguely suggests that proof of spoliation or the like has some undefined
potency; scarcely ever is there deliberate and rigorous appraisal of its
exact legal effect. A good deal of the difficulty very likely runs back to
the intertwining of punitive and remedial ideas already noted. Some
courts, notably English chancery of the older days, have been full
enough of righteous indignation to disregard logic. Others, seemingly
11. Compare § 1048 of Wigmore's superlative work in the 1904 edition with the revision
in the second edition of 1923. Even in 1904 this author conceded the possibility of stretch-
ing the principle of declarations against interest to cover such litigants' admissions as were
qualified in all respects save unavailability of the declarants. No doubt he would cheerfully
have foregone the indefensible requirement that the interest involved must be pecuniary or
proprietary, so that his suggestion would explain use of confessions as a direct basis for
convictions.
12. See, however, the quotation at p. 243 infra from W. D. Evans' Notes to Pothier.
13. Yet common agreement is lacking as to why this is so. See Professor Chafee's
review of Wigmore's second edition in (1924) 37 HARv. L. R v. 513, 518-519. The clash of
theories there indicated does not complicate our present problem.
14. See Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay (1935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 1138, for what the
present authors believe to be the only really rigorous analysis of the whole definitiona
problem suggested immediately above.
15. 1 JoxEs, Co-ENTAxius ox EviFNacE (2d ed. 1926) § 84 et seq., gives a fair Idea
of the raw material. Wigmore's text is more illuminating because of his independent
thought and language.
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alert to just that risk, have discounted evidence of obstructionism with-
out making articulate the criteria of their action. In particular, there
has been at least tacit recognition that juries may damn litigants on
general principles, and that, once a verdict is rendered by Philip drunk,
effective revision by Philip sober is difficult to achieve. Our next sec-
tion, treating of the need for deliberate misbehavior to found an implied
admission, casts heavy emphasis upon the importance of separating
punitive emotion and remedial reasoning.
II
Intention Contrasted with Negligence as a Basis for
Implying Admissions
Having forsworn the idea of loading our footnotes with references,
we should at least base our text upon specific controversies. Here is
the first: In 1905 and 1907 Missouri legislated to limit freight rates.
The railroads affected challenged the validity of this legislation,-and had
some measure of success in the lower Federal courts."0 The Supreme
Court of the United States, however, decided against the carriers in
1913.11 During the pendency of the suits, higher freight charges than
those prescribed by the challenged statutes had been collected. In due
course, shippers and consignees applied to recover the excess payments.
These applications or some of them were referred to a Special Master.18
Before him it appeared that in connection with each shipment the rail-
road involved had given either shipper or consignee bills or documents
sufficiently describing the transaction to permit accurate calculation of
overpayments. So many years having intervened, however, much of
this documentary material was lost or destroyed before the hearings.
Originally, the carriers possessed copies or duplicates. But at least some
of the carriers, in normal course of clearing their files,' had destroyed
their records for a number of the years involved.
The Special Master found that the routine destruction of records was
neither willful, intentional, nor fraudulent making away with evidence,
but that there had been negligence in failing to issue such orders as
16. See St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley, 168 Fed. 317 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1909),
and other litigation there referred to.
17. Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 474 (1913), with which should be read Minnesota
Rate Cases, id. at 352 (1913).
1. The casesx still unreported at the time of writing, are part of proceedings entitled
Union Trust Co. of New York v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. Through
the courtesy of the Special Master, Hon. George C. Hitchcock of St. Louis, the authors
have had access to copies of the material court papers.
19. There was testimony in behalf of one carrier that it would have required 59,036




would have secured preservation of documents necessary to enable the
respective carriers to respond to their potential refund obligations. He
ruled that each claimant must establish shipments and payment of
freight, and must also satisfactorily explain lack of original shipping
documents if he sought to rely upon secondary evidence. Having done
so, he became entitled to the benefit of the doctrine that omnia prac-
sumuntur contra spoliatorem. The Special Master's characterization of
the effect of this doctrine shrewdly embodies 'various judicial expres-
sions. He mentions re-enforcement of otherwise weak evidence from
a plaintiff, and the "presumption" or "strong inference" against a spoli-
ator which will aid in sustaining a "prima facie" case otherwise made
out. Under the circumstances of the immediate litigation, he suggests
that the doctrine should have the consequence of "shifting the burden
of evidence" to the carrier "to show that intervenor [claimant] is not
entitled to recover the overcharges as alleged in his petition." These
rulings having been carried on exceptions before the District Court of
the United States for the Eastern Division of the, Eastern Judicial Dis-
trict of Missouri, Judge Faris on April 8, 1933, rendered an oral opinion
sustaining the exceptions. This opinion, emphasizing the fact that each
claimant had been originally furnished with adequate documentary evi-
dence to establish his claim, asserts that the spoliation principle cannot
be developed from mere negligence but only from fraud.
The Judge had authority with him. An Arkansas decision on facts
essentially identical says flatly that because "the evidence falls short of
showing that appellee [railroad] or its officers intentionally destroyed
the papers and. records in question for the purpose of preventing them
from being used as evidence", the trial court did not err "in refusing to
apply the spoliation doctrine .... "0 Instances of looser language are
naturally discoverable,21 but we have not turned up a single opinion
20. Gallup v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 140 Ark. 347, 355, 215 S. W. 586, 588
(1919). Cf. In re Campbell's Will, 100 Vt. 395, 402-403, 138 At. 725, 728, 54 A. L. R.
1369, 1373 (1927), and 102 Vt. 294, 298, 304, 305-306, 147 Atl. 687, 691-692 (1929), where
the signatures and attestation clause of an instrument propounded as a will had been torn
off and destroyed after the death of the alleged testatrix. The court insists that a pre-
sumption of due execution arose if such action had been intentional and illegal, even
though innocent and bona fide. At one point the first opinion slips into talk of "con-
structive fraud", which seems unfortunate as suggesting an artificial implication of law
rather than a natural implication of fact. But the conclusion is quite defensible. Why
did the destroyer bother to make away with part of the document unlem he supposed
that it constituted or evidenced due execution? Such being the line of thought, however,
why emphasize illegality?
21. E.g. Middleton v. Middleton, 188 Ark. 1022, 1026, 68 S. W. (2d) 1003, 1006 (1934):
"Where some written instrument, which is a part of the material evidence in a case, has
been destroyedi the presumption arises that, if it had been produced, it would have been
against the interest of the spoliator, and, where the instrument destroyed is of such nature
as to destroy all evidence, there follows a conclusive presumption that, if produced, It
[Vol. 45
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deliberately superposing the consequence of an implied admission upon
a basis clearly involving nothing beyond oversight or carelessness.
Of course an empirical approach of this sort is not generally to be
recommended, and we gladly shift from dogmatism to deliberation by
examining a group of due process cases straddling the boundary line
between punitive and compensatory procedure. Hovey v. Elliott" re-
duces itself in essence to discussion of the propriety of striking out an-
swers and entering a final adverse decree because of defendants'
contempt in refusing to pay into court a sum of money immediately in
controversy. This stringent judicial act was held to have violated due
process, as amounting to condemnation without hearing. White, J.,
wrote the opinion. Less than twelve years later, the same learned judge
wrote a majority opinion to the effect that under a state anti-trust act
an allegedly offending corporation might constitutionally have its plead-
ings stricken out and be subjected to judgment for penalties of $10,000
in consequence of its refusal, without bona fide effort or any reasonable
showing of inability, to produce certain witnesses for examination and
certain books for inspection.23 Hovey v. Elliott was distinguished be-
cause it "involved a denial of all right to defend as a mere punish-
ment.112 4  In the second case the legislature had exerted its "undoubted
right to create a presumption of fact as to the bad faith and untruth of
an answer begotten from the suppression [of] or failure to produce the
proof ordered, when such proof concerned the rightful decision of the
cause. . . . In a sense, of course, the striking out of the answer and
default was a punishment, but it was only remotely so .... [Far from
denying due process, this decision preserved it] by the presumption that
the refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of due
would have established the claim of the adversary of him who destroyed the instrument
where it is shown that the destruction was willful." Grammatically, this involved zsn-
tence may be read as affxing the requirement of willfulness only to the latter "conclusive
presumption" and not to the unadorned presumption which precedes. However, there
was not the least doubt that the documentary destruction immediately under considera-
tion had been intentional. Also, this case arose in the very jurisdiction which produced
the Gallup case (supra note 20) fifteen years before, and cites the earlier case without the
least hint of disapprobation.
22. 167 U. S. 409, 412-414, 418-419, 446 (1897), most of the intervening pages con-
taining a laborious review of English and American precedents.
23. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 336 et seq., 341-342, 346 et seq.,
15 Ann. Cas. 645 (1909). Fuller, C.j., and Peckham, J., dissent without opinion. See 3
WiGmoRE oN EvIDnc (2d ed. 1923) § 1859e, and both this section and § 278 n. 4a, in
the Supplement of 1934.
24. 212 U. S. 322, 350 (1909), on which page the opinion repudiates the idea of dif-
ferentiating the cases because the trial court lacked express statutory authority in the earlier
litigation, and possessed such authority in the later litigation. But see Walter Cabinet Co.
v. Russell, 250 Il. 416, 422, 95 N. E. 462, 464 (1911), apparently insisting upon the neces-
sity of legislative aid to support such an order as that in the Harnmond case.
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process was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted
defense."25
Characterization of the principle involved as a "presumption" may
cause momentary hesitation to the stickler for exact definition. Pro-
fessor J. B. Thayer and his disciples have trained us to think of pre-
sumptions as conditional imperatives, requiring specified findings of fact
only in the absence of rebuttal, and the imperative outlined above seems
quite unconditional.26 But actually an opportunity for rebuttal is
afforded. Orders to expunge pleadings are not entered ex parte. "The
recalcitrant party," says the New York Court of Appeals, "has, then,
had opportunity to meet the charges at a fair hearing. He rejects that
opportunity when he willfully disobeys the order of the court for the
production of evidence .... [The court may exercise its power to strike
out an answer and enter judgment pro conJesso] only in aid of its func-
tion to determine the truth of the charges made after due consideration
and after opportunity for a hearing accorded to all parties."2 At any
time before or even during that hearing, rebuttal is possible through
production of the suppressed evidence. The really important point for
us is that the courts require an adequate showing of rational connec-
tion between the withholding of evidence and the conclusion of guilt
or culpability. This reiterates a constitutional doctrine made painfully
familiar to state legislatures in recent years. Unless the propositions
of fact forming the basis of statutory presumption have some logical ten-
dency to establish the conclusion; the presumption violates due process.28
So, to carry the doctrine forward in more specific detail, it seems per-
fectly sound that a defendant who suppresses evidence with respect to
one only of several issues may not in consequence be precluded from
contesting the other issues. This is neatly illustrated by a proceeding
to recover damages for fraudulently inducing the sale of corporate
stock at one-tenth of its true value, where defendant set up (1) a gen-
eral denial, (2) accord and satisfaction, and (3) a sealed release.
During introductory proceedings defendant failed to disclose evidence
relating to the value of the stock and nothing else. The trial court
under an empowering statute struck out the entire answer and entered
25. 212 U. S. 322, 350-351 (1909).
26. See the talk of irrebuttable presumption in (1925) 10 CoRe. L. Q. 234, 241.
27. People v. George Henriques & Co., Inc., 267 N. Y. 398, 403, 196 N. E. 304, 305-
306 (1935).
28. Morgan, supra note 6, at 324-5. On principle, the same doctrine should apply to
judicially created presumptions. "It must however," says 2 EvAs' POTIIXER (1806)
337-338, "be remembered, that whatever impropriety there may be in any such suppres-
sion or fabrication, the effect of it ought only to be applied to the decision of the fact in
dispute, and a punishment should not be inflicted under the name of a presumption, when
the fact supposed to be presumed is not in truth believed".
[Vol. 45
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judgment for plaintiff. The order was modified on appeal to prevent
defendant only from contesting the issue of value, and to permit contest
of the other issues.29
Simple as all this is when thus outlined, we think it of fundamental
importance to our discussion. In the immediate connection, the demand
for logical relation or relevancy between the misconduct and the pro-
cedural consequence fully justifies our tentative empirical conclusion
that true implied admissions arising from "spoliation" and the like must
involve an element of deliberation or intention, negligence by itself
being insufficient. For obviously our logical relation is traced through
the well-known formula: The litigant's conduct indicates a belief rele-
vant and detrimental to some feature of his case; therefore he holds that
belief; therefore his case in this feature is defective.30 But if the liti-
gant's conduct results only from happy-go-lucky carelessness, and not
from specific motive or intention to achieve a specific end, the whole
backbone of the formula breaks. The necessary showing of belief is
lacking.
HI
Implied Admissions as General Substantive Evidence
Revert to the hypothetical sale of goods case already sketched and
imagine that on the issue of delivery the plaintiff does not give enough
ordinary evidence to get him to the jury. Defendant, who has books of
account and who knows the identity and whereabouts of A, the delivery
agent, puts in no evidence whatever, and then moves for a non-suit or
directed verdict. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to the aid of a pro-
bative inference because of his adversary's reticence. Assuming that
29. Feingold v. Walworth Bros., Inc., 238 N. Y. 446, 454-455, 144 N. E. 675, 679
(1924), noted in (1925) 10 Come. L. Q. 234, and (1925) 19 Irx. L. RLv. 594. Two
judges dissented on the ground that there was no adequate showing of willful suppres ion.
The main opinion says: "The punishment is for withholding proof and is properly limited
to excluding what the proof presumptively establishes .... The power to punish is lim-
ited by the presumption which attaches to the suppression of the evidence suppressed." It
may be added that there were several defendants here, and that the order of discovery
was directed to and disobeyed by some of them only. It was held improper to strike out
the pleadings of the others. Cf. the later case of People v. George Henriques & Co., Inc.,
267 N. Y. 3985 196 N. E. 304 (1935), where failure to disclose evidence relating to a cer-
tain stretch of time came first, then a case was shaped exactly covering the period of non-
disclosure, next the answer in that case was stricken out, and finally the court without
testimony made nineteen separate findings of fact and twenty-four separate conclusions of
law and entered a final judgment of injunction and liquidation. This judgment was
reversed. See also the brief chapter on this topic in RAGLD, Dxscov~my BEFonE Tnr
(1932) 154 et seq., indicating some looseness in the State and even the lower Federal
courts. For an analogous limitation of consequences under the "dean hands" doctrine
consult Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 245 (1933).
30. 1 WiGmoRE, EvImEcE (2d ed. 1923) § 267.
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plaintiff has the burden of proof, the standard result is the granting of
defendant's motion. Over and over again it has been ruled that a party
in the defensive position is not to be prejudiced for holding his fire when
an opponent has failed to make what is commonly called for convenience
a prima Jacie case.31 But now suppose we add to plaintiff's evidence a
showing that after action brought defendant either (1) destroyed an
account book or (2) spirited the key witness A out of the jurisdiction.
In deciding whether this auxiliary showing should get plaintiff to the
jury, we strike at once the problem of logical connection or relevance
opened by the preceding section. It is a hard problem, harder indeed
to grasp and solve than straightaway hearsay questions. For hearsay,
while it has to fight around or through a definite exclusionary rule, is
typically in assertive form and therefore canalized. One knows where
it will tend to carry the jury, if admitted, and can easily decide whether
it has logical bearing upon the case. The extra-judicial assertion: "I
killed X," has manifest relevance if the issue be whether the speaker
committed homicide, or whether X is dead. Its irrelevance on many
other issues is equally manifest. But the stuff from which implied ad-
missions may be made frequently does not flow between canal banks.
Its possibilities are rather those of a blob of mercury tossed on a table
top. Coherence and course of motion are both doubtful. Perhaps the
triers of fact may not feel able to draw any inference from a mere show-
ing that defendant "destroyed an account book". How do they know
whether the act was purely careless or intentional? What was in the
book? Household accounts or something about the deal with plaintiff?
Until there has been a preliminary showing on all this, we cannot even
make a decent start toward inferring anything against the spoliator.
Wigmore thus explains the common doctrine that where an opponent
has destroyed a document some evidence of its contents must precede
31. Middletown Trust Co. v. Bregman, 118 Conn. 651, 657-658, 174 Atl. 67, 70 (1934);
Condon v. Schoenfeld, 214 Ill. 226, 230-231, 73 N.'E. 333, 335 (1905) ; Stimpson v. Hunter,
234 Mass. 61, 65, 125 N, E. 155, 157, 7 A. L. R. 1067, 1070 (1919); and Galbraith v.
Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 236, 196 N. E. 36, 39 (1935), where the dissenter seems to quarrel
less with the principle at large than with its immediate application. Out of a crowding
multitude of cases we cite typical ones from representative jurisdictions. Some remarks
by the usually careful Hammond, J., in D'Addio v. Hinckley Rendering Co., 213 Mass.
465, 468, 100 N. E, 647, 648 (1913), are profoundly puzzling: "We are not dealing with a
case where at the close of the plaintiff's testimony the presiding judge rules that there
is no case for the plaintiff, or in other words that the defendant is not called upon to put
in his evidence. In such a case there are no presumptions to be drawn against the defendant
for his failure to explain whatever may be used against him. The presiding judge in sub-
stance rules that there is no need of explanation on his part;. and that is enough. In the
present case the ruling was made at the close of the whole evidence . . . . If there was
anything in the evidence produced by the plaintiff which bore against the defendant, It
was called upon to explain and it had the fullest opportunity to do so." The most natural
interpretation of this passage is that a trial judge who overestimates the force of evidence
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the creation of a hostile inference.12  Nor is this the only point of rele-
vancy which must be watched. Assuming all the foregoing doubts
cleared away, why did the defendant act? His object, proper or im-
proper, may have been quite remote from that of hampering the imme-
diate inquiry 3 In electing between two or more appropriate alterna-
already put in may cast upon defendant a damaging obligation of disproof, although if he
had properly appraised the evidence no such obligation would have been created. This
seems dubious doctrine. Simes v. Rockwell, 156 Mass. 372, 374, 31 N. E. 434, 45 (1392),
is also puzzling. Here one issue was the authority of defendant's husband to represent
her in a business transaction. The husband testified, but with marked circumspaction. The
court remarks that the spouses were the only ones who knew the full truth. "Facts
appeared at the trial which justified the court and jury in believing that the defendant,
conniving with her husband, deliberately attempted to suppress this evidence. It was
not merely an absence from the trial, or a failure to call witnesses, which could not
prejudice a defendant unless a case was first made out requiring an answer, but it was an
attempt to deprive the plaintiff of the testimony of the witnesses who knew the fact in
dispute. It indicated a belief on the part of the defendant that the testimony, if given
truly, would be valuable to the plaintiff and damaging to herself. The suppression of
important 'evidence is always a fact to be weighed against the party suppressing it... .!'
The opinion then cites a case where there was evidence that a party had suborned a wit-
ness. Cross v. Bell, 34 N. H. 82, 88-89 (1856), stating the general rule according to our
text, accepts a very flimsy prima fade case.
32. 1 .VIGmoaE oNz EviDF NCE (2d ed. 1923) § 291 at pp. 603-604. See Gage v. Parmelee,
87 Ill. 329, 344 (1877): "There is but conjecture, that the books, if produced, might
furnish evidence in support of the allegations of the bill." Also Hay v. Peterson, 6 Wyo.
419, 438, 45 Pac. 1073, 1078, 34 L. R. A. 581, 589 (1896): "But some general evidence of
such parts of their contents as are applicable to the case must first be given, before any
foundation is laid for any inference or intendment on account of their non-production?'
Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 155 N. Y. Misc. 262, 277, 279 N. Y. Supp. 228, 245
(Sup. Ct. 1935) (accord). Cf. Login v. Waisman, 82 N. H. 500, 502, 136 Ati. 134. 136 (1927),
where a witness who had disappeared, allegedly at defendant's instigation, was apparently
quite ignorant of the facts hearing upon one vital issue; also People v. McWhorter, 4 Barb.
(N. Y.) 438, 441 (1848), where witnesses not called by defendant to sustain an alibi
might have been asleep at the vital time.
33. In Gage v. Parmelee, 87 i1. 329, 342 (1877), the spoliator claimed to have acted
on hearing a threat "to file a bill . .. for the purpose of exposing his business to the
public." In Hay v. Peterson, 6 Wyo. 419, 433-434, 435, 440, 45 Pac. 1073, 1076, 1077, 1078,
34. L. R. A. 581, 585-586, 587, 590 (1896), the explanations included stupidity and a sup-
posed duty to a deceased employer. In both cases the books or some of them had been
produced for examination before destruction. See also Mastin v. Noble, 157 Fed. 506,
512-513 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), refusing to allow hostile presumption or inference where
business papers were destroyed intentionally but partly "as useless and cumbersome matter
by the housewife" and generally "in line with the habit of many unmethodical perons."
Cf. Longacre v. Yonkers Ry. Co., 236 N. Y. 119, 125-127, 140 N. E. 215, 217-213 (1923),
where defendant explained that a witness not called had given untrue testimony on an
earlier occasion. Merrill v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 170 Alinn. 332, 339-337, 212 N. W.
533, 534 (1927), interestingly discusses the ambiguity of inference from failure to call medi-
cal witnesses. It is a matter of common knowledge that criminal defendants frequently
keep off the stand to avoid the generally devastating effect of testimonial impeachment
by proof of former convictions. Robert P. Reeder, Cornment Upon Failure of Accused
to Testily (1932) 31 ACH. L. Ry. 40, 56; Andrew A. Bruce, The Right to Comment on
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tive inferences, nothing short of omniscience could make the choice
infallible.
Here in particular a possible distinction may be noted between de-
struction of an account book and efforts to prevent a witness from
giving testimony. Normally, the documentary evidence will be unequivo-
cal and comparatively reliable. Deliberate making away with it by
defendant, relevance of the contents having been established, easily jus-
tifies an inference that he believes the truth inimical to his case. This is
not nearly so sure as to the witness. For "witnesses see fact$ differently,
and almost every trial of an issue of fact demonstrates that they may
testify honestly and still be mistaken."34 There is a ponderable chance
that in dealing with the witness the motive may have been to suppress
untruth. But we do not believe this distinction sound. Admittedly
determinations of fact in human tribunals are not based upon divine
revelations of absolute truth. Nor, for litigious purposes, is "truth"
what either party sincerely believes. Courtroom truth is what a jury
or the judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence. The cor-
rect hostile inference from efforts to prevent a witness from giving testi-
mony is that the offending party, by disclosing unwillingness to let the
tribunal use human recollection and all the other materials relevant to
the shaping of courtroom truth, gives support to the conclusion that a
proper finding would be against him.85
Coming through these preliminary points to the fundamental ques-
tion of using implied admissions for general substantive purposes, we
find plenty of real or apparent disagreement. New Hampshire has
expressed the view that even bribing a material witness to absent him-
self is "conduct ... chiefly persuasive as distinguished from probative
the Failure of the Defendant to Testify id. at 226, 232. Cf. 1 WioMoRE ox EvmrENC
(2d ed. 1923) § 194a, and 1934 Supplement, §§ 194, 194a, 194b; also People v. Pignataro,
263 N. Y. 229, 235, 188 N. E. 720, 722 (1934); and Professor Hinton's acute comment In
(1926) 21 IL. L. Rav. 396. In Fross v. Wotton, 44 P. (2d) 350, 354 (Cal. Sup. 1935),
the relevancy of claims of privilege against self-incrimination is carefully worked out.
On other reasonable grounds as well, there is often cause to deny hostile inferences from
criminal defendants' failure to testify. (1935) 94 A. L. R. 706-708. See generally (1926)
74 U. oF PA. L. RaV. 746.
34. Harrison v. Harrison, 124 Iowa 525, 527, 100 N. W. 344, 345 (1904), holding that
evidence of litigant's activities with respect to the witness might properly be "left for the
consideration of the jury" but did not justify the view that the litigant had implledly
admitted his cause was without merit or unjust. Cf. note 58 infra.
35. Cf. Lw v. Woodruff, 48 Ill. 399, 401 (1868), a breach of promise case where
plaintiff put in defendant's letters to her, but he refrained from putting in hers to him.
The court charged about a presumption that plaintiff's letters contained evidence against
defendant, or he would not have withheld them. This was disapproved. "If such were
the legal conclusion, it would place almost any single man at the mercy of an artful and
designing woman . . . . Such facts should be left to the jury, as practical men, to weigh,
consider and determine what they prove, if anything." The female of the species ... I
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in its effect, and ... cannot take the place of proof of necessary facts."-'
New York, starting with at least some inclination in the other direction,
has more recently produced a good deal of judicial language consistent
with this view.37 As on most contested topics, there is much use of weasel
words. A common and highly objectionable method of expression "pre-
sumes that the testimony of the missing witness, or the contents of the
missing document, would have been unfavorable to the suppressing party
if adduced."3 The New Hampshire court jeered at this as a character-
36. Login v. Waisman, 82 N. H. 500, 502, 136 AtL. 134, 136 (1927), and see case
from this and other States collected in (1931) 70 A. L. R. 1320, 1326.
37. In Gordon v. People, 33 N. Y. 501, 506-507, 508-509, 513 (1865), a murder case
turning upon identification, the judge charged that defendant's failure to call available
witnesses to meet an apparently strong case made by the prosecution caused what was
before not absolute to ripen into certainty, and also caused "circumstantial evidence of this
sort" to become "of a conclusive character". This was held too strong, but the majority
say: "The absence of such [rebuttal] evidence, especially, when it appears to be in the
power of the prisoner to furnish it, creates a strong presumption of his guilt, a strong
inference against him, and is a circumstance greatly corroborative of the truth of the evi-
dence given upon the other side. In a doubtful case, it would justify the jury in resolving
the doubt against him." The dissenter, who wished to sustain the charge, was attracted
by a quotation from Beccaria, the criminologist: "Imperfect proofs, of which the accused,
if innocent, might clear himself, become perfect." But see Bleecker v. Johnston, 69 N. Y.
309, 313 (1877), and Schwier v. New York Central Rr. Co., 90 N. Y. 553. 564 (IS1
both very frequently cited and both saying or suggesting that a party's failure to call a
witness is not evidence against that party of the existence of any fact. Mleyer v. Binsky,
128 App. Div. 589, 590, 112 N. Y. Supp. 860, 861 (Ist Dep't 103), disapproves a charge
that a jury "may find from [defendant's] presence and such failure to put him on the
stand, that if he were put upon the stand he would tesify in favor of the plaintiff". The
jury might properly infer "that his testimony would not be favorable to himself"; but
"silence of the party refusing to take the stand is not to be accepted as affirmative cor-
roborative evidence in favor of his opponent"; such silence is not "a positive admiscion
of the truth of the story told by the plaintiff . . . . The distinction is a substantial
one . . . 2' Perlman v. Shanck, 192 App. Div. 179, 183-184, 182 N. Y. Supp. 767, 770
(1st Dep't 1920), and Polachek v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 Misc. 16, 22, 263 N. Y.
Supp. 230, 239 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd. without opinion 240 App. Div. 1028, 268 N. Y.
Supp. 995 (1st Dep't 1934), summarize earlier cases.
38. Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 119 Conn. 483, 488, 177 At. 524, 527 (1935),
failure to produce order book permitted inference that book "would have contained in-
formation antagonistic to the contention of the defendant'; Houser v. Austin, 2 Idaho
204, 212, 10 Pac. 37, 42 (1886), hiring witness to leave country raises presumption that if
truth appeared it would be against the misbehaving litigant; Central Stock & Grain Ex-
change v. Board of Trade, 196 Ill. 396, 406-407, 409, 63 N. E. 740, 744, 745 (1902), refusal
to produce documents and answer questions under claim of privilege causes presumption
that evidence if produced would be unfavorable (one judge dissenting, because party had
been called by opponent instead of taking stand in his own behalf); Parsons v. Martin,
11 Gray 111, 113, 115 (Mass. 1858), talk about "strong presumptions . . .pregnant sus-
picions that the truth, if developed, would operate against him"; D'Addio v. HinckMey
Rendering Co., 213 Mass. 465,-469, 100 N. E. 647, 648 (1913), if party can but does not
explain matters apparently telling against him "it properly may be presumed that no truth--
ful explanation will help him"; and Tremaine v. H. K. Mulford Co., 317 Pa. 97, 106, 176
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ization of substantive proof: "Had the plaintiffs offered to show that
there was unsubmitted evidence in their favor which would strengthen
their case, it [i.e. the offered showing] would have been excluded as
incompetent .. . . This is no more than saying that proof must rest
upon evidence and not upon its absence."' 9  Massachusetts, at least,
displays great fondness for telling the jury to draw such inferences as
they see fit, thus avoiding any particular clarity, but certainly making
possible the substantive use of the implied admissions involved.40
Turning to litigation where inferences from obstructive conduct have
unquestionably been given substantive effect, or where clear willingness
to permit such effect has been evinced, 4 we think that detailed exposi-
tion of one of the most cited American spoliation cases-Pomeroy v.
Benton"2 -will be more useful than abstract discussion. Pomeroy and
Benton had been partners until the latter bought out his associate. Later
Pomeroy sought an accounting from his former partner. Ostensibly
the partnership had been in the dry goods business. The defendant,
Atl. 212, 216 (1935), quotes Corpus Juris on inference or presumption that unproduced
evidence "if .. .given . . . would have been detrimental." Cf. Wilson v. Grace, 273
Mass. 146, 152, 173 N. E. 524, 527 (1930). And see CAL.. CODE CIv. PROC, (1931)
§ 1963 (5), listing among rebuttable presumptions: "That evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced."
39. Stocker v. Boston & Maine Rr., 84 N. H. 377, 380, 151 Atl. 457, 458, 70 A. L. R.
1320, 1324 (1930).
40. Whitney v. Bayley, 4 Allen 173, 175-176 (Mass. 1862); McKim v. Foley, 170 Mass.
426, 427, 49 N. E. 625 (1898), where no fewer than four inferences, only one of them
adverse, were conceivable as a result of failure to call expert witnesses, and the upper
court suggested the wisdom of minimizing unjust inference by exercising discretionary
restrictive power; Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 603, 604, 85 N. E. 945, 947, 948 (1908)
(several variant phrasings); and Little v. Massachusetts N. E. St. Ry. Co., 229 Mass. 244,
118 N. E. 245 (1918). See also Reetz v. Mansfield, 119 Conn. 563, 567, 178 At!. 53,
55 (1935).
41. Downing v. Plate, 90 III. 268, 273 (1878), states and applies the doctrine "that
where a party has wrongfully destroyed the only written evidence of the fact which Is In
existence, his unsupported evidence, as to the contents of that writing, shall not be allowed
to prevail against the testimony of any other witness,--for the presumption is that the
paper, if it could be produced, would corroborate the other witness." Amite Bank & Trust
Co. v. Standard Box & Veneer Co., 177 La. 954, 966-967, 149 So. 532, 536 (1933), enun-
ciates very similar doctrine. Cf. Colvin v. Kokusia & Kaisha, 72 F. (2d) 44, 46 (C. C. A.
5th, '1934); Starkweather v. Conner, 38 P. (2d) 311, 314 (Ariz. 1934); People v. Spaulding,
309 Ill. 292, 298, 305 et seq., 141 N. E. 196, 199, 202 (1923) (evidence that defendant in
murder case had killed the most important witness of the crime for which he was being
tried) ; Phelps v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 655, 659, 75 S. W. (2d) 217,' 219 (1934) ; Beren-
son v. Conant, 214 Mass. 127, 131, 101 N. E. 60, 61 (1913) (failure to testify to repel
accusations against motives and conduct); Attorney-General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264,
316, 134 N. E. 407, 423 (1922) (very positive language under strong circumstances some-
what analogous to those of preceding case); Merchant v. Houston Gas & Fuel Co., 78 S.
W. (2d) 656, 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). See also the quotation in note 21, 311pra.
42. 77 Mo. 64 (1882). See also Gaugh v. Gaugh, 321 Mo. 414, 454, 11 S. W. (2d)
729, 748 (1928).
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however, was found to have taken fliers in wet goods-whisky and
high-wines-using firm money and concealing the collateral profits.
The only full record of this alcoholic venture he kept in a so-called pri-
vate account book. Because "he did not wish any one to look into his
private accounts", defendant before trial tore out and burned the leaves
having to do with the whisky transactions. Thus it became "impossible
to tell what was the amount . . . realized by reason of his fraudulent
practices .... How often the money defendant invested... was turned
over, was re-invested, never will be known."1
3
This is a hard situation, verging on the non-justiciable. Plaintiff pre-
vailed, but only by vote of a bare majority. Their reasoning begins
with the finding "that defendant destroyed that book after suit brought,
for the deliberate and sole purpose of cutting off investigation into the
magnitude of his operations in whisky."" Thus we get a basis for the
desired inference:, His action indicates belief that he was deeply in the
wrong; therefore he did so believe; therefore he was deeply in the wrong.
Then the opinion speaks out flatly with an attribution of probative con-
sequences to the spoliation: "It is because of the very fact that the evi-
dence of the plaintiff, the proofs of his claim or the muniments of his
title, have been destroyed, that the law, in hatred of the spoiler, baf-
fles the destroyer, and thwarts his iniquitous purpose, by indulging a
presumption which supplies the lost proof, and thus defeats the wrong-
doer by the very means he had so confidently employed to perpetrate
the wrong."4  Next came the real rub. How many dollars should
plaintiff receive? The judgment was not a simple choice between black
and white, conviction or acquittal, ouster or continued possession40
It contained a problem of measurement. The court seized eagerly upon
the delightful tale of the chimney-sweep's boy and the artful gold-
smith. 7 There, however, the tribunal had helpful standards in (1) the
size of the socket from which the jewel had been abstracted and (2) e %-
pert testimony as to the value of a jewel of the finest water which would
fit the socket. No such precise objective limitations could be laid down
in the partnership accounting case. The capacity of Missouri and adjoin-
43. 77 Mo. 64, 71, 84-85 (1882).
44. 77 Mo. 64, 85 (1882).
45. 77 Mo. 64, 86 (1882). The leading case of Clark v. Turner, So Neb. 290, 301,
69 N. W. 843, 846, 38 L. R. A. 433, 454 (1897), says: "It would certainly be very danger-
ous to extend [the maxim about spoliation] so far as to relieve a party charged with
proving the contents of a written instrument from all obligation to produce some evidence
of a competent character ... Y
46. For a very strong "black and "white" case, see Middleton v. Middleton, 183 Ark.
1022, 68 S. W. (2d) 1003 (1934), where spoliative destruction of an aleged holographic
will was held to justify disregard of a statute requiring proof of signature and hand-
writing by three disinterested witnesses. Three justices dissented.
47. Amory v. Delamirie, 1 Stra. 505 (K. B. 1722).
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ing States for consumption of alcoholic beverages during the time cov-
ered by defendant's liquor dealings was a hopelessly vague and extrava-
gant top limit. For a measure of recovery, then, the court had recourse
to plaintiff's petition alleging that defendant's net profit from misuse of
firm money had been $200,000.48 This had some support in a line of
English cases dealing with disputes about the contents of destroyed or
suppressed wills, deeds, and the like. At their strongest these cases may
be interpreted as assuming, after due proof of spoliation, "that the con-
tents of the thing spoliated are what they have been alleged to be .... ""
Now of course this suggestion that the spoliator shall be taken to
confess liability to the maximum of his opponent's claim carries our
thought back to the device of striking out defensive pleadings and enter-
ing judgment when proper discovery is refused. But, if we keep away
from vindictiveness and stick to logic, some discriminations may be
made. Obstinately continued non-disclosure after the full scope of an
opponent's allegations is realized may well be an implied admission that
these allegations are at least 100% true. So may destruction of evi-
dence after such realization, and it will be remembered that the partner-
ship-whisky case contained a finding of destruction after suit brought.
Defendant in this very case, though, testified that his spoliation occurred
two and one-half years before plaintiff filed his petition.60 Had this
date been accepted, and had there been no evidence that plaintiff other-
wise brought home the specifications of his claim before the spoliation
occurred, reasoning that defendant had admitted such claim to the full
would be distinctly flimsy.51 In truth, the partnership-whisky case con-
tains an over-load of punitive fervor."2 It had first come to the appellate
48. 77 Mo. 64, 67, 88 (1882).
49. This description is Lord Eldon's in Barker v. Ray, 2 Russ. 63, 73 (Ch. 1826), and is
accompanied by expressions of doubt as to the propriety of carrying the doctrine to such
extremes. Other lines of citation in the case under discussion are not so pointed, and it
should be remarked that some plaintiffs in the English documentary controversies were
able to produce more or less convincing secondary evidence. An American authority,
Hudson v, Hudson, 287 Ill. 286, 299, 122 N. E. 497, 502 (1919), speaks thus of the effect
of destruction of a deed by the grantor: "Having destroyed it, it is he who must suffer
the inconvenience from the loss of the evidence and not the grantee. When the grantee
has proved that the deed was executed, the presumption is that it conveyed the highest
title it could convey,--that is, a fee simple." Under American conditions at least, 13 not
this a natural "presumption"-quite likely the court really means "inference"--with respect
to the habendum of any ordinary deed?
50. 77 Mo. 64, 66, 71 (1882).
51. Here it is well to hear in mind the principle, amusingly illustrated by "Joannes"
v. Bennett, S Allen 169, 172 (Mass. 1862), that the spoliative destroyer of a document may
not give secondary evidence of its contents.
52. And so, it seems to us, do many opinions suggesting a distinction between (1) mere
non-disclosure and (2) destruction, permitting more radical inference from the latter.
E.g. Bleecker v. Johnston, 69 N. Y. 309, 311 (1877). Here, though, it can be argued that
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court some eight years earlier, on which occasion the tribunal expressed
vigorous distaste for defendant's operations .3  Upon reappearance it
received a hot welcome. For evidence of this we need only to observe
that the $200,000, originally made the measure of recovery, contained
assumed profits from side dealings in other commodities than alcoholic
beverages. But the spoliation affected liquor accounts only. This being
called to the court's attention on rehearing, the majority backed down
and cut the whisky award to $100,000 minus a further adjustment in the
interest of a third party. Even more significant, the $100,000 figure
was reached from considering the testimony of "one or more witnesses
.. to the fact that they understood from [defendant], that his profits
on the whisky on hand would be $100,000" and "other testimony in
the record, tending to show the same fact.'14 A lawyer minimizing this
case might well contend that the judgment came to rest on defendant's
express admissions, and not at all on the inference or presumption from
spoliation. The contention on the other side can hardly go beyond a
claim that destruction of the account carried some weight along with
plaintiff's other evidence. This whittling down of the significance of
spoliation certainly is an anticlimax, forced by practical difficulties likely
to give other courts pause.
IV
Implied Admissions for Purposes of Limited Confirmation
In the early days of the nineteenth century, W. D. Evans wrote as
follows:
"That a party shall be actually forced to produce the evidence, so as to
be punished for refusal, is a proposition totally unwarranted by authority,
and I suppose that is not what was meant by the expressions about quoted
[from Lord Mansfield in Roe v. Harvey], and what is said respecting
leaving the refusal as a presumption to the jury, should it [sic] be received
with considerable qualification; for it cannot be admitted that such a
presumption should stand instead of all other evidence, and supply the total
deficiency of proof. It is only in weighing the effect and substance of
evidence, in its nature adequate to the support of a fact in question, that
the irrevocable act of destruction implies greater apprehension. When a similar distinction
is taken between bribing a witness and merely persuading him to stay away, the punitive
element again inevitably suggests itself. Gregory v. Sorenson, 214 Iowa, 1374, 1379-13so,
242 N. W. 91, 94 (1932). But here a secondary explanation lies in the greater risk of
bribery and the consequent likelihood that it would be shunned except when imparative.
Such reasoning is suggested by 2 EvAys' PoTrm (1806) 337, which continues with the
warning quoted in Note 28, supra.
53. Pomeroy v. Benton, 57 Mo. 531, 543, 549 (1R74).
54. 77 Mo. 64, 90 (1882). Haid v. Prendiville, 292 Mo. 552, 565-566, 238 S. W. 4S2,
455 (1922), also "roars so loud and thunders in the index', but ends with a noiss more
like that of a penny whistle.
1935]
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the jury can take into consideration the opportunity allowed to the opposite
side of contradicting the evidence if false, or of destroying the inference
from it, if erroneous, and thereby conclude that evidence, otherwise sus-
picious, is true: or that an inference, otherwise slight and feeble, is
correct." 55
If such a cautionary statement seemed in order when an opponent
at common law was not compellable either to testify or produce docu-
ments,56 unfriendly inference or presumption thus being often the only
available device for exerting pressure, it should be taken still more to
heart in these days of comprehensive testimonial compulsion. Evans'
views have indeed caught the eye of our American benchY But neither
he nor his judicial converts seem to give much more than a sincere
expression to an instinctive attitude. The call for explanation remains
unanswered.
One step, at least, is easy. There are cases where it would be plainly
improper from a logical point of view to allow an implied admission
greater probative effect than is comprehended by our term limited con-
firmation. Suppose the defendant in our long-enduring sale of goods
hypothesis tries hard to hide his account book but fails, and the plaintiff
puts the book in evidence; or suppose that the same defendant bribes
the delivery agent A to leave the State; but A turns up at the trial and
testifies favorably for the plaintiff. Thus the jury get the very evidence
about the purport of which presumptions were to be built or inferences
drawn. Occasion for such guesswork has vanished. An extremist might
say that evidence of defendant's misconduct should not be receivable
even for confirmation. "When the witness is in fact present and testi-
fies," despite efforts to keep him away, "the jury has before it his full
55. 2 EVANS' PoTnim (1806) 169. See also id. at 337.
56. 4 WIa~omR oN EVmc (2d ed. 1923) § 2217.
57. Evans is quoted or paraphrased in Bleecker v. Johnston, 69 N. Y. 308, 312 (1877),
and Arbuckle v. Templeton, 65 Vt. 205, 211-2121 25 AtI. 1095, 1097 (1892) ; also in (1926)
6 B. U. L. REV. 50. The New Hampshire cases cited in Notes 36 and 39 supra obviously
point the same way; see, too, the additional New York opinions cited in Note 37, supra;
People v. Deitsch, 237 N. Y. 300, 303, 142 N. E 670, 671 (1923), as inferentially explained
in People v. Pignataro, 263 N. Y. 229, 234-235, 188 N. E. 720, 722 (1934); also F. R.
Patch Mfg. Co. v. Protection Lodge, 77 Vt. 294, 329, 60 At. 74, 84 (1905). Jones v.
Thomas, [1934] 1 K. B. 323, under a statute requiring corroboration of complainant In a
material particular, clearly suggests Evans' theory. Cf. Commonwealth v. Clark, 14 Gray
367, 373 (Mass. 1860); Boyle v. Columbian Fire Proofing Co., 182 Mass. 93, 103-104, 64
N. E. 726, 730 (1902); and Belding v. Belding, 358 Ill. 216, 220-221, 192 N. E. 917, 919
(1934), in all which language is used less from the point of view of limiting the effect
of an implied admission than from that of showing a legitimate effect attributable to It.
Anderson v. Irwin, 101 Ill. 411, 416 (1882), and Tanton v. Keller, 167 Il. 129, 144, 47
N. E. 376, 380 (1897), are examples of cases asserting that one whose opponent deliber-
ately destroys a writing need not make strict proof of contents. Their idea seems to be
not merely that a slight showing will support a finding of relevance (see p. 236, supra),
but that the spoliation effectively emphasizes such showing.
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knowledge, and is the sole judge of its character and weight, and deter-
mines whether it is favorable or unfavorable to the party." 53s But with
this we do not agree. About any witness there is always a question of
credibility, and many uses of documents involve questions of authen-
ticity, accuracy, and variable inferences. To get the whole "courtroom
truth" on either witness or writing, the jury should know that the
defendant was so apprehensive as to try to suppress the evidence. 9
Putting behind us this common but specialized situation, we begin on
the general question by repeating a suggestion already made. Since
parties now have all sorts of compulsory process to help them get at
evidence even from opponents, it may be wise policy to reverse the old
practice of exaggerated inference from suppression and underrate such
inferences instead. If, from a purely logical point of view, this be arti-
ficial, our practical student of public policy will perhaps applaud the
device for encouraging or compelling acquisition and presentation of
definite, solid proof. Such argument holds, however, only for suppres-
sion short of destruction or claim of legal privilege. It weakens or fails
where an opponent burns a paper, kills a witness, or clings tight to a
self-incriminating document composed by and belonging to him.
More broadly, if less reasonably, the Evans doctrine has delightful
simplicity and definiteness. Nobody can blame a judge for loving a
58. Harrison v. Harrison, 124 Iowa, 525, 527, 100 N. W. 344, 345 (1904). Wilson v.
Grace, 273 Mass. 146, 153, 173 N. E. 524, 527 (1930), seems to make a remarkable sugges-
tion. W testified to a material fact and also testified that when he previously told
plaintiff of this fact the latter urged him to report it falsely to an insurance company.
Plaintiff had no occasion to know about the fact before W told it to him. Yet the opinion
seems to consider it worth deliberating whether plaintiff's conduct "was an admid-on of
the truth of [W's] statement . . . " How can an extrajudicial "admlion" by an utterly
uninformed man add force to the positive testimony of an informed witness?
59. The case of testimony by a witness who alleges that his virtue has triumphed over
a litigant's improper blandishments or worse is of course very common. The effect of
the implied admission is not always carefully thought out. State v. Alexander, 184 Mo.
266, 270-271, 275, 83 S. W. 753, 754, 755 (1904), evidence of persuasion, money, and
threats admissible as "tending to show the consciousness of guilt on the part of the
defendant; so, too, the weight to be attached to it was a matter for the consideration of
the jury"; State v. Mathews, 202 Mo. 143, 146, 148-149, 100 S. W. 420, 421 (1907), threats
and promises an "admi on by conduct that the party's cause is an unrighteous one"
and indicate "consciousness of guilt"; State v. Howe, 287 Mo. 1, 6, 7, 11-12, 223 S. W.
477, 478, 479 (1921), "Evidence is always admissible for the purpose of showing that
the accused has attempted to procure false evidence or destroy evidence against him-
self!' In these quotations there is too little analysis of the content of the testimony
sought to be headed off. Cruikshank v. Gordon, 48 Hun 303, 309-310, 1 N. Y. Supp.
443 (2d Dep't 1888), 118 N. Y. 178, 187, 23 N. E. 457, 459 (1890), is blind in the uppzr
court but definite below: "A witness for the plaintiff testifies to one of the slanderous
utterances, and . . . that defendant offered him $1,000 to go to Canada to avoid testify-
ing on the trial. The real point of the evidence of this witness was an intent [attempt?]
to induce the witness by defendant to 'not remember' .. .. It was a virtual admion
of the speaking of the slanderous words?'
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rule of thumb which gives him a universally applicable stock tag to his
jury charges. Several citations already offered show the yearning for
brass-bound formulas in the present connection. ° To which it will be
replied that simple fixity is not justice in a world of infinite variation.
Let us try, then, to peg this same idea higher on the intellectual scale.
From time immemorial Anglo-American courts have shown determina-
tion to hold jurors' eccentricities within limits. Consider, for instance,
the handling of probable cause in malicious prosecution; the judicial
interpretation of writings; the doctrine of judicial notice; and the
whole theory of presumptions. In manipulating such implied admis-
sions as we are discussing, there is really formidable intellectual diffi-
culty, and conscientious jurors may be grateful indeed for a compre-
hensive rule of thumb instruction. If, as is obviously the case here, the
rule of thumb sedulously avoids overstating the significance of implied
admissions, it may have some effect in restraining reckless appraisal of
evidence by jurors not utterly conscientious. Emphatically our implied
admissions do hold out threats of undue prejudice and general inflam-
matory effect,61 particularly as'the conduct giving rise to them moves
deeper and, deeper into the morally reprehensible. Judges themselves
have not been immune to such prejudices, as witness Pomeroy v. Benton,
where the facts never went to a jury at all and a majority of the Supreme
Court ripped to pieces the more temperate findings of a referee. Hence
it cannot possibly be imagined that an admonitory rule of thumb would
control a really inflamed jury. With such "lay gents", to use the words
of a famous old malicious prosecution case," there is no thoroughgoing
safeguard save where the circumstances justify either a refusal on the
part of the trial judge to submit the issues at all or the setting aside of a
verdict. The rule of thumb derived from the Evans doctrine would
create such occasions more often than a rule giving implied admissions
from obstructive conduct a general substantive value. For, under the
former rule, the ordinary evidence sought to be supported by the admis-
sion is required to have per se an optimum value justifying submission
of the issue on which it bears.
Lest the foregoing passages be misinterpreted, we hasten to state
explicitly that they represent only our exposition of a possible line of
thought. Whether that line has a value outweighing the disadvantages
of rigidity is a question which cannot be answered at all without much
further intelligent experimentation than the decisions thus far mani-
60. See the passage from Beccaria in note 37, supra, and the Illinois and Louisiana cita-
tions in note 41, supra.
61. This is well put in People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 464-465, 14 N. E. 319, 342
(1887). Nor should one forget the case of the vanished niece and the unfortunate uncle,
described by Coke in the Third Institute, cap. 104.
62. Pain v. Rochester, Cro. Eliz. 871 (1602).
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fest, and which very likely calls for different answers in varying cate-
gories of litigation. Our concluding section offers some suggestions upon
the problems of this paper at large which have particular pertinence to
the subject immediately under comment. 3
V
Implied Admissions for Purposes of Impeachment Only
As already stated, other obstructionistic acts than suppression of evi-
dence may form bases of implied admissions. Some of the cases hitherto
cited illustrate this. But more comprehensive comment is desirable.
Suppose the reverse of suppression-an attempt to fabricate evidence.
The hypothetical sale of goods plaintiff calls W to testify that defendant
bribed W to assert falsely that W was present when A arrived with the
goods, heard defendant tell A that he had ordered no such goods, and
saw A take the goods away. If believed, this testimony is perfectly pat
as to defendant's apprehensions on the issue of delivery, and might, in
respect to that issue, be given just as much general substantive effect
or limited confirming effect as evidence that defendant tried to bribe A
to refrain from testifying. But suppose TV's testimony is only that de-
fendant in general terms offered him a bribe to testify on the defendant's
side.64 There are more issues than one, and we now have no firm logical
tie with all or any of them. This is only a floating implied admission.
Punitive impulse might give it substantive effect as to every litigated
issue; cautious logic might well deny it any effect save a general im-
peaching backlash at defendant's case, he having disclosed himself as a
tricky fellow who may have done dirty work at other cross-roads in his
proof. Similar contentions may be advanced as to evidence of an attempt
to bribe a juror at a former trial of the same caseya And so, perhaps,
63. Pp. 257-259, infra.
64. DeGroodt v. Skrbina, 111 Ohio St. 108, 114, 144 N. E. 601, 603, 38 A. L. R. 591,
594 (1924), offer of money for "standing on my side"; no statement of any precise topics
on which witness might testify; opinion quotes Wigmore that evidence of admissions by
a party comes in because "clearly inconsistent with the truth of his contention"; the
annotation in A. L. R. is good. McHugh v. McHugh, 186 Pa. 197, 40 Ad. 410 (I93),
contains illustrations of attempts to fabricate testimony both generally and specifically.
In Nowack v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 166 N. Y. 433, 435, 437, 60 N. E. 32, 33 (1901),
objections prevented disclosure of the precise fabrication intended; the opinion uses terms
of impeachment rather than substantive use or even limited confirmation. Gebhardt v.
United Rys. Co., 220 S. W. 677, 680, 9 A. L. R. 1076, 1031 (1920), is precie as to the
false testimony desired, vague as to the evidentiary value of the s-owing of attempted
bribery. Rex v. Watt, 20 Cox Cr. Cas. 852 (1905), contains a somewhat careful exposition
of the rationale of implied admissions, but is indeterminate as to their probative effect.
65. Hastings v. Stetson, 130 Mass. 76 (1881), "You go for me" or "You do what is
right, and I will pay you for it." State v. Friend, 210 Iowa 980, 959, 230 N. W. 42S,
429 (1930), does not decide whether such evidence is usable only for impeachment.
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when there is a showing that defendant threatened a witness or sought
to get him to leave the state, it not appearing that there was definite
knowledge or suspicion as to what testimony the witness would give.00
A fairly common basis offered for implied admissions is evidence
that after plaintiff's claim arose or his action began, defendant conveyed
away his property under suspicious circumstances. The argument is:
He seeks to avoid attachment, execution, or both; therefore he believes
himself liable; therefore he is liable. As practitioners in a Common-
wealth allowing great freedom of mesne attachment, we regard this
argument with deep skepticism. Entirely apart from views on the
merits, it is customary for Massachusetts lawyers to prevent incon-
venience to their clients by rigging devices to impede attachment. Avoid-
ance of execution is a little harder to explain, but may well result from
appreciation of juries' vagaries instead of doubt as to the justice of a
party's cause or even the truth and cogency of his evidence.01 Closely
related to such cases, and enjoying more enthusiastic acceptance, is evi-
dence that an accused man ran away 8 or tried to bribe an officer to let
him go.0 9 It seems to us that all these kinds of evidence should be
handled with cautious discrimination, and usually restricted to impeach-
ment of the actors' cases. Granting general substantive effect to the evi-
dence is dangerous, and limited confirmation is hard to work out and
justify. It does not follow that merely because the defendant shows
himself tricky or apprehensive, .the plaintiff or prosecution must be lily
white or have an impregnable case. But the addition of special circum-
stances may have an important effect. Thus, in our hypothetical sale
of goods case, suppose X had been near enough to hear the interview
between defendant and the delivery agent A, but X's proximity was not
then known to defendant. Immediately after discovering that X was
within earshot, defendant gratuitously conveys all his property to his
wife. The fact of the transfer bears most pertinently on the issue of
delivery.70
66. Such may have been the case in Commonwealth v. Smith, 162 Mass. 508, 509-510,
39 N. E. 111, 112 (1895). In Maynard v. Bailey, 85 W. Va. 679, 682, 102 S. E. 480,
481, 9 A. L. R. 981, 982-983 (1920), the threatening letter possibly indicates lack of
information as to what the addressee might say. (1930) 9 T=x L. REV. 100 discusses
threats, etc., against witnesses. (1929) 62 A. L. R. 133, 136 collects cases on evidence of
threats to keep witnesses away from criminal trials.
67. Some cases are collected in (1930) 65 A. L. R. 1304, 1307, and (1932) 80 Id. at
1131, 1139. See also Banfield v. Whipple, 10 Allen 27, 31 (Mass. 1865), and Carroll v.
Carroll, 262 Mass. 10, 159 N. E. 517 (1928), which last may well be construed as em-
bodying an express admission.
68. Cases are collected in (1923) 25 A. L. R. 876, 886. The question of relevancy
may easily become very difficult. Suppose, for instance, the runaway may have been
guilty of murder, robbery, and bootlegging, and is on trial for the last only.
69. Cases are collected in (1934) 93 A. L. R. 805, 810.
70. Cf. State v. Rowe, 24 S. W. (2d) 1032, 1036 (1930), where the evidence was that
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From the foregoing paragraphs the reader will perceive that we regard
mere general impeachment as the pis aller of the implied admission.
Much matter denied more specific value may be admitted for this use.
We might well let in evidence of careless destruction of documents, not
to infer their contents but to suggest a slovenly and unbusinesslike gen-
eral attitude by the destroyer, affecting the weight to be accorded his
other evidence. And so, to prove general trickiness, evidence that de-
fendant hastily burned unread papers might be used. But some matter
is too tenuously connected with litigated issues to cling even here,
despite its indication of obstructive tendencies."'
VI
Supplemental Topics
So far, we have avoided questions of agency and the like. What about
affecting a party by evidence of other persons' obstructive conduct?
Can there be vicarious implied admissions? Moore v. Atlantic Coast
Line Rr. Co."2 is interesting both on its facts and in its reasoning. Fire
destroyed plaintiffs' building, and they sued the defendant railroad,
claiming that the conflagration had been started by sparks from a loco-
'motive. A man 0, found to have been as well acquainted with the facts
as at least one of the plaintiffs, became active in rounding up testimony.
There was evidence justifying a finding that plaintiffs knew what 0
was doing and accepted the benefit of the testimony he procured. Two
witnesses, in the jury's absence, testified that 0 and another man offered
them $75.00 each to testify to facts indicating that sparks from a loco-
motive caused the fire. Three more witnesses, one of whom was O's
brother and the others of whom had been in contact with 0 since the fire,
testified to "substantially the same story" sought from the first two wit-
nesses. The trial judge refused to let the evidence of these two witnesses
defendant caused witness to be attacked and badly injured immediately after the latter's
refusal to support an alibi. AMclnturff v. The Insurance Co. of N. America, 243 Ill. 92,
93 N. E. 369 (1910), does not discuss an apparent opportunity to develop an implied
admission where a litigant killed a witness after the latter had tQtified against him.
Banach v. Bohinski, 107 Conn. 156, 157-153, 139 Atl. 633 (1927), presents just the rever-2;
exclusion of evidence of a conveyance to defendant's wife sustained because "neither the
deed itself, nor the other circumstances disclosed by the record, afford legitimate infer-
ence that it was prompted by any consciousness of liability."
71. So, for instance, a party's falsehood in respect of a fact foreign to the immediate
issues has precarious evidential standing; it is extremely like impeachment of a witnea
by evidence of specific irrelevant lies. But see Masterson v. Berlin Street Ry., 83 N. H.
190, 193-195, 139 AUt. 753, 756-757 (1927). Incidentally we note a suggestion that where
an implied admission is confined strictly to an impeaching office, it exactly parallels a prior
contradictory statement for witness impeachment, and escapes all hearsay taint. Doe v.
Lucy, 83 N. L 160, 162, 139 At. 750, 751 (1927).
72. 137 S. C. 319, 323 et seq., 135 S. E. 473, 474 et seq. (1926).
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as to attempted bribery be put before the jury. On defendant's appeal
from an adverse judgment, this was held to have been error. The opin-
ion seems to argue that defendant had made a sufficient circumstantial
case of authorization or ratification by plaintiffs of O's acts, and aside
from this "an innocent party is no more entitled to reap the benefit
in a Court of justice of the corrupt practices of others than a party
who has personally participated in the corrupt acts .... Courts are con-
cerned with the purity of the stream which has been introduced into the
channels of justice and not with fixing responsibility for its pollution." 8
This case may be interpreted conservatively or liberally. The con-
servative reading suggests a composite rule involving three principles.
(1) The remarks quoted at the end of the last paragraph certainly are
sound, and would permit impeachment of plaintiffs' case in all aspects
over which 0 is found to have exerted influence. On the showing above,
the testimony of the three witnesses could be thus impeached. This is per-
missible quite aside from any authorization by plaintiffs, but of course
the fact and scope of O's influence must be established by competent
evidence or reasonable inferences. (2) Evidence of O's conduct does
not justify erection of an implied admission with general substantive
force or even limited confirming effect except so far as plaintiffs
learned, comprehended, and approved what 0 had done. Why does our
statement exclude O's conduct if originally authorized by plaintiffs? For
the simple reason that under such conditions the admissions are found
in the authorization, not in the subsequent conduct, and may therefore
be attributed 'directly to the principals without any talk or thought of
agency. So, under this conservative analysis, all true implied admis-
sions by agent reduce themselves to adoptive admissions, and do not
represent any general application of the "talking agent" doctrine. The
argument for such a conclusion is that implied admissions depend upon
the state of the litigant's mind in fact and not upon any artificial at-
tributing of responsibility for the talk or acts of another. (3) Follow-
ing the same line, any attempt to make O's belief that plaintiffs have a
weak case serve per se as substantive evidence of the fact believed or
even impeach any part of plaintiffs' evidence, except so far as 0 enunci-
ates that belief under standard testimonial sanctions, runs smack against
the barrier of hearsay.
74
73. 137 S. C. 319, 333, 135 S. E. 473, 477 (1926).
74. 1 WIo Eo ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 265 et seq. In Winchell v. Edwards,
57 III. 41, 48 (1870), where ties of relationship and perhaps of technical privity bound
appellees to the persons suspected of misconduct, the court said that "the fabrication of
evidence ...raises a strong presumption against those who appear to be real parties to
the suit, which must affect the case of the appellees, however innocent they may be."
Dorris v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 809, 14 S. W. (2d) 136, 62 A. L. R. 133 (1929), where
the prosecuting witness testified, holds the admission of evidence as to threats and bribery
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But now suppose that our principal, instead of being human, is a cor-
poration. Principle (1) holds easily enough. The practical phrasing
of principle (2) requires careful consideration. Where shall we find
"the state of the corporate mind"? Surely not alone in duly assembled
stockholders' meetings. Indeed, that might be about the last place to
look for knowledge of business details. Fully appreciating this difficulty,
a leading New York case, considering asserted efforts by a street railway
claim agent to bribe a witness, thus summarizes its doctrine:
"He was not working for himself, but for the defendant [corporation],
and, as he represented it with reference to the subject of witnesses, his
conduct not only tended to show that its case was weak, for witnesses are
not bribed unless it is thought necessary, but to cast a doubt upon the
testimony of the other witnesses who were looked up by him and sworn
by the defendant. It indicated as a result of his investigation for the
defendant that honest witnesses could not be procured who would swear
to a defense.1 75
The corporate concept obviously does necessitate some such attribution
of responsibility for the impliedly manifested beliefs of agents, but the
attributing might be stopped at a point higher up the scale-specifically,
with the executive in general control of the claim agents. Thus where a
Massachusetts criminal defendant sought to prove efforts by an inter-
preter and a police officer to buy false testimony from persons who did
not actually take the stand, rejection of defendant's offer was sustained.
But the court would admittedly have been troubled had the prosecuting
officer authorized the bribery.76 Even this latter and more limited
respecting this witness by defendant's mother and sister erroneous, there being "not a
line of evidence that appellant knew anything about any threats, if they were made, or
that he knew anything about the giving of money, if any was given." Rex v. Watt, 20
Cox Cr. Cas. 852 (1905), where there was evidence of false testimony at an earlier stage
of the case, says that defendant is not presumed responsible for such perjury; there must
be, and in the actual case was, connecting evidence. And see People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y.
427, 463-466, 14 N. E. 319, 342-343 (1887), where important witnes.es had run away to
Canada. Gregory v. Sorenson, 214 Iora, 1374, 1379, 242 N. W. 91, 94 (1932), contains
a passage commending instructions that testimony of X's efforts to influence a witnezs
"should not be considered unless EX] was the agent of the appellant or unless appellant
ratified her actions and statements after they were committed or made?' Obviously, "was
the agent" means "was instructed to do exactly or substantially what -he did". Why did
not the judge make the finding of agency as a preliminary matter? Aldrich v. Aldrich,
215 Mass. 164, 168-169, 102 N. E. 487, 489 (1913), seems to lose its way in metaphysica.
This was a will contest involving alleged undue influence. The beneficiary asserted to have
exercised such influence, being named as executrix, propounded the wilL The opinion
appears to say that as beneficiary she "is not an adve se party, and . . . may be called
as a witness either by the executor [sic] or contestant, and the failure of the proponent
... to give evidence in support of the will she was required to offer . . . did not convert
her silence into an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, that if she had testified her
testimony would have been prejudicial to its validity."
75. Nowack v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 166 N. Y. 433, 439, 60 N. E. 32, 34 (1901).
76. Commonwealth v. Iin Sing, 202 Mass. 121, 123, 125 et seq., 88 N. E. 918, 920
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formula for corporate principals evidently requires some modification
of principle (3) as to the non-effect of an agent's belief as such. Massa-
chusetts and New York alike are saying that to some extent the mind
and the beliefs of an agent may become acceptable in court as the mind
and beliefs of the corporation.
Having thus far widened the possibilities where an incorporated liti-
gant is concerned, we find a further attractive opening for liberalization
where the principal, human or corporate, has said: "Agent, I know
nothing of this claim against me. Go out, ascertain the facts, and take
every needful measure to make my victory as sure as may be." This
blanket authorization, if it really expresses the state of the principal's
mind, is an express admission of ignorance rather than an implied ad-
mission of liability. But if an agent so instructed went forth and, with-
out ever reporting to his chief, subsidized witnesses to commit perjury,
it seems highly unlikely that evidence of the misconduct would be given
less effect than if the principal had fully ratified the agent's acts or done
like acts directly himself.7
Our second and final supplementary topic has some apparent con-
nection with the question of implied admissions by agent, but funda-
mentally leads into very different considerations. Somewhat over twenty
years ago, a freight brakeman swinging off the side of a box-car was
struck and fatally injured by the locomotive of a speeding express train.
His widow sued the railroad for wrongful death, and in her action had
the burden of proving that at least one member of the express engine
crew saw the freight brakeman in a position of peril soon enough to give
him effective warning. Both engineer and fireman testified that they
did not see the unfortunate victim "earlier than an instant before he was
struck." Other direct evidence on the issue was lacking. The jury
returned a verdict for the widow, perhaps disbelieving the foregoing testi-
mony. So there came before the upper court the question whether
jurors might as it were put a backspin on the trainmen's disavowals.
The court disposes of this in a sentence: "Mere disbelief of denials of
facts which must be proved is not the equivalent of affirmative evidence
in support of those facts." Judgment was entered for the defendant.18
et seq. (1909), a careful and comprehensive opinion.. Cf. Commonwealth v. Enwrlght,
259 Mass. 152, 157, 156 N. E. 65, 67 (1927): "It is assumed, however, that if the district
attorney should unfairly suppress evidence he would thereby subject the case of the
Commonwealth to the same adverse inferences as would result from similar conduct by
any other party to a cause." Freeman v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 30 S. W. (2d)
176, 181-182 (Mo. App. 1930), admits against a street railway evidence that the rail-
way's lawyer advised a motorman to claim privilege against self-incrimination at an
inquest, and that the motorman then made the claim, speaking through this lawyer.
77. Consult on this topic 2 RasTATE-nr, AGcENcy (1933) §§ 286 et circa.
78. Cruzan v. New York Central & Rr. Co., 227 Mass. 594, 597, 116 N. E. 879, 880
(1917). The printed record shows (pp. 5, 6-7, 11, and 12) that the fireman testified he saw
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This is representative of many cases."°
The principle stated in the foregoing quotation is obviously correct so
far as a testimonial assertion (positive or negative) simply fails to move
the mind of the trier of fact-leaves him a neutral unbeliever rather
than an active disbeliever. Also, the principle is unassailable so far as
the trier of fact accepts the reverse of a testimonial assertion solely
because of his own stupidity, obstinacy, or prejudice. No sound thinker
could applaud a conclusion thus unreasonably reached. But so far as
the trier of fact accepts the reverse of a testimonial assertion because
he reasons intelligently from some factor beyond the assertive words in
and of themselves, the principle is debatable. Nobody would think of
denying that, if defendant testified: "I did not strike the plaintiff", and
X testified: "Defendant struck plaintiff", there might be a proper find-
ing that defendant struck plaintiff. Equally, or almost equally, nobody
would deny that, if defendant so testified and evidence was given that
he had previously said: "I struck the plaintiff", a like finding might be
proper. It may be suggested that this,falls beyond the stated principle,
as not being an instance of "nere disbelief"; the jury chooses or elects
between defendant's testimony and X's testimony in the first case, be-
tween defendant's testimony and his own admission in the second case.
But surely this general kind of situation was in the court's mind when
it framed the statement of principle quoted above, for prior self-contra-
diction by the fireman or engineer might have been shown.
At this point, of course, the hearsay rule forces a differentiation.
Extra-judicial statements by a litigant may be used substantively against
him as admissions. Extra-judicial self-contradiction by a third party
witness is, according to the standard rulings, inadmissible hearsay if
offered for substantive use and not confined to impeachment. Suppose,
though, that the denials of the fireman and the engineer were disbelieved
because of suspicious circumstances observed in the manner and answers
of the witnesses while on the stand. This puts hearsay out of the picture,
and we frankly doubt whether in such a situation common sense should
permit disparate treatment of litigant's and third party's disbelieved
testimony. However, a sharp technician might contend that so far as a
court respects the conventional stupid rule forbidding a litigant to im-
peach his own third party witness, the same court ought to furnish a
the brakeman "hanging off the side of the freight car just before the engine struck him";
the engineer, that he knew nothing of the accident until the fireman said it had hap-
pened. Plaintiff's brief seeks to argue from the condition of the track, etc., that the
fireman saw the victim sooner.
79. One of the more recent decisions is Clairmont v. Cilley, 85 N. H. 1, 7, 153 At.
465, 468 (1931): "Falsity of testimony is no proof of what is true and disbelief doea not
supply the need of proof . . . . Otherwise any fact might be proved by discrediting
testimony to the contrary. While the falsehood of testimony may add to the weight to
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crude counterbalance by arbitrarily denying substantive force to his
opponent's impeachment of that witness through implications from the
witness's testimony or behavior on the stand. Even this super-ingenious
contention becomes inapplicable, if, during legitimate cross-examination,
defendant elicits assertions favoring him from plaintifl's witness, and
something then or thereafter occurring in the interrogation of the witness
causes the jury to disbelieve these assertions. Should plaintiff argue for
granting substantive effect to the disbelief, defendant could not truth-
fully reply that he, the cross-examiner, had been blocked off from im-
peaching the witness.
But we should waste time by arguing elaborately about possible dis-
tinctions between litigants and third parties as witnesses, for judges
show little inclination to turn actively against a party even his own
testimony because found untruthful or mistaken.8 0  There is distinct
reluctance to give implied self-contradiction the same effect as contra-
dictory testimony by others or express contradictory admissions by the
litigant-witness himself. Still, some peculiar opinions are found, as for
instance in a Massachusetts decision where plaintiff had been in collision
with a taxicab, alleged to have been defendant's. Defendant testified
that he operated ten taxicabs, including one bearing the registration
number which plaintiff took down at the accident; but that W, whose
name plaintiff obtained as that of the driver of the taxicab in the col-
lision, although employed by defendant, was not working for defendant
on the night of the accident; also that defendant knew of no collision
involving the particular taxicab on the night in question. W testified
that he was not driving at the material time and knew nothing of the
accident. Sustaining a finding for plaintiff, the court says:
"False testimony of a party may have probative force in civil cases. If
the judge who saw the witnesses and heard them speak believed that
the defendant wilfully swore falsely and was in collusion with the driver in
misstatement of the facts he could have considered such conduct on the
part of the defendant as in the nature of an admission from which with
be given evidence to the contrary, the testimony by itself does not go far enough to
establish the fact it denies." Consider in this connection the multitudinous assertions that
prior contradictory statements by third party witnesses must not be given affirmative pro-
bative force. E.g. Southern Railway Co. v. Gray, 241 U. S. 333, 337 (1916), cited in the
Cruzan case, supra note 78.
80. Moulton v. Moulton, 178 Minn. 568, 569, 227 N. W. 896, 897 (1929), where
plaintiff had to prove the fictitious character of an alleged indebtedness between the two
defendants, and her only evidence came from defendants, who steadfastly maintained
that there was a genuine indebtedness. Said the opinion: "The court could not find a
fact necessary to be proved, namely that there was no debt, as to which there was no
affirmative testimony, by a claim that the negative testimony was unworthy of belief.
This is the holding of the cases throughout." Cf. (1911) 21 Ann. Cas. 1121, 1123. Atlas
v. Silsbury-Gamble Motors Co., 278 Mass. 279, 283, 180 N. E. 127, 128 (1932), faintly
differentiates litigant from third party.
(Vol. 45
ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM SPOLIATION
other evidence liability might be inferred.... In weighing the other
testimony in the case with the defendant's testimony and conduct the
judge could have inferred that the defendant's driver was operating the
taxicab under such conditions as made the defendant responsible for his
acts.... The conduct of the defendant could be found to have probative
force because of its tendency to prove a consciousness of liability and an
endeavor to escape from it .... In the circumstances disclosed by this
record, mere disbelief in testimony is not given effect as positive proof of
the fact denied." 81
These remarks will bear some unravelling. Perhaps there is a sugges-
tion that the tribunal might reasonably have inferred a collusive under-
standing between defendant and his driver to "cover up" on the facts
touched by their testimony. Any such prearrangement gives some basis
for an implied admission, the evasive testimony later proffered being used
only to evidence the nefarious scheme. 2 Going beyond this interpreta-
tion, we encounter a definite logical difficulty. Suppose the defendant
says: "My taxicab was not in the collision, nor wat its driver working
for me at the moment." Discrediting the first assertion will primarily
wipe it off the evidential slate, and may secondarily sideswipe defendant's
credibility in his second assertion. But now suppose the whole statement
is: "My taxicab was involved in the collision, but the driver was on a
frolic of his own." We cannot, runs the common argument, believe the
contrary of the "frolic" assertion until competent evidence has con-
vinced us that the driver was acting for his master; hence we can never
reach the latter conclusion in a case barren of other evidence on the issue;
furthermore, once having reached that conclusion on such other evidence,
we should be guilty of a futile superfluity in talking about the probative
effect of mere disbelief.8 3 This second interpretation explains the result,
although not the language, of the case under examination, for there seems
to have been substantial other evidence on both the contested issues. It
also explains some other cases superficially at odds with the general denial
of probative backspin. 4 Further, it is quite unassailable when the
litigant's disbelievable statement was extra-judicial, as where the prose-
cution seeks to give evidence that a policeman said to defendant: "You
are the guilty man", when the only reply made was: "I am not," and
evidence is lacking of concurrent or independent guilty behavior.ss
81. D'Arcangelo v. Tartar, 265 Mass. 350, 352, 164 N. E. 87, 88 (1928).
82. Atlas v. Silsbury-Gamble Motors Co., 278 Mass. 279, 283, 180 N. E. 127, 128
(1932), bears out the interpretation suggested above.
83. See Maguire, Adoptive Admissions in Massachusetts (1929) 14 Ass. L. Q. (no. 6)
62, 76 n. 54.
84. E.g. Barrie v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 87, 92, 76 S. W. 706, 707-703
(1903)1 where the physical facts contradicted plaintiff's denial of looking for the car and
not seeing it; he seems to have been in a dilemma-if he looked, he must have seen, and
if he did not look, he was culpably negligent.
85. Commonwealth v. Trefethan, 157 Mass. 180, 199, 31 N. E. 961, 968 (1892).
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Nothing more damaging than neutral unbelief is justified on such a
showing. But if a litigant takes the stand and testifies that a certain
thing occurred, why may not his hang-dog demeanor properly permit
the jury utterly to disbelieve him, even though there is no other evidence
on the issue?
To the question just asked, a recent Utah opinion forcibly replies by
asserting ignorance of any authority "for the broad proposition that a
trial court is justified in basing affirmative findings on negative evidence
merely because of the appearances of the witnesses. While the demeanor
of the witness in testifying is very important and should be given con-
sideration by the trier of fact, still there must be something more than
the batting of an eye, the coloring of the cheek, or the twiddling of the
thumbs as a basis for finding facts."180 Well and good, but this very
opinion cites and quotes from a Massachusetts case 87 standing for the
proposition that a jury may "find, in the very teeth of a denial by a
witness, an opposite conclusion based upon inferences from other parts
of the evidence." 8 This proposition we have already suggested as be-
yond criticism. Certainly we do not suspect the Utah judges of denying
it. Neither, presumably, would they deny that "other parts of the evi-
dence" might be supplied by the particular witness himself. Suppose
the plaintiff in a personal injury case testified positively that he was
stone deaf and therefore had not heard a warning signal. However, when
counsel standing behind the witness's back denounced him as a perjurer,
the witness turned purple with rage and assaulted the lawyer. A finding
that the witness could hear would be entirely proper. The Utah opinion
is simply warning us (1) that such effective self-refutation is not to be
assumed and (2) that its occurrence must therefore appear in the ap-
pellate record if the case is carried up. Where the facts are tried to a
judge, master, auditor, or referee, the finding or report can easily state
the refuting circumstances. Where the trial is by jury, counsel must be
sufficiently alert and ingenious to get some statement of the circum-
stances into the stenographic notes. This last problem is nothing new.
Every experienced advocate realizes the need of shaping his evidence so
that its printed reproduction will strike the eye of the upper court some-
where nearly as effectively as the original presentation struck the jurors'
senses.
Still a third interpretation of the Massachusetts opinion quoted above
is that it permits probative backspin to the extent of limited confirma-
tion. This fits both result and language. It is not without support from
other jurisdictions."
86. Chapman v. Troy Laundry, 47 P. (2d) 1054, 1062 (Utah, 1935).
87. Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 520-521, 80 N. E. 450, 451 (1907).
88. McDermott v. Sallaway, 198 Mass. 517, 519-520, 85 N. E. 422, 423 (1908).
89. See the language quoted from Clairmont v. Cilley, note 79 supra; also the result
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The best which can be said of the foregoing paragraphs is that they
raise honest uncertainties. Suppose we try a second way of explaining
such judicial hesitancy as the Utah court reveals. When a man says:
"The train did not whistle until an instant before it hit him", he may
be right or wrong. If wrong, his error may be (1) the result of uncon-
sciously inverted or deliberately misstated recollection, or (2) the result
of positively stating as a present recollection a version of an incident he
has forgotten, or (3) the result of positively stating as a present recollec-
tion a version of an incident he never observed. But in (2) or (3) he
may by chance hit the exact truth, and so it is illogical to infer the re-
verse of what the man asserts simply from finding that he never saw,
or does not now recollect, the incident. This finding makes him a neutral
testimonial factor. Such ambiguity of inference might explain the general
denial of probative backspin. The obvious reply is that cross-examina-
tion and other methods of correction and impeachment should be relied
upon to show the jury not only whether the testimony is defective but
also the source and nature of the defect. Here again the arguments come
close to a stand-off, and we are left uncertain.
A third explanation for the judicial hesitancy already noted is satis-
factory so far as it goes, but inadequate. If disbelief per se operates as
proof, it follows that the jury may always find on any issue unfavorably
to the party who adduces testimonial evidence superficially favorable
to himself, despite lack of other evidence respecting that issue.0 This
introduces a highly anomalous possibility, freeing the jurors from judicial
control to a disquieting extent. The explanation, however, is only a
reiteration of what we have already said about the probative worthless-
ness of disbelief proceeding from stupidity, obstinacy, or prejudice. It
fails where disbelief is reasonably induced by factors perceptible to the
trial and appellate courts as well as to the jury.
VII
Conclusion
Employment of implied admissions for impeachment, proper logical
foundations being assumed and the reasonable requirements of relevancy
and materiality being otherwise respected, seems to encounter no judicial
doubt and to raise no practical or theoretical difficulty. Employment of
and reasoning in State v. Poplowski, 104 Conn. 493, 133 AUt. 671 (1926), where the issue
was whether defendant's horses had been permitted to be at large on a public highway
without a keeper; general circumstantial evidence indicated the affirmative of this issue,
and: "The defendant does not explain the presence of the hores on the highway. On
the contrary, he tells a false story designed to show that his horses were not in fact on
the highway . .. "
90. (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 831, 832.
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such admissions, erected on the basis of conduct intended to obstruct the
judicial process, for general substantive or affirmative purposes is
theoretically justifiable, provided there be scrupulous compliance with
the demands of logic. Considerable judicial hesitation about this latter
employment, however, has been manifested. Considerable practical
objection may also arise, partly because courts sometimes adulterate
their logic with punitive enthusiasm, and partly too because, even where
logic holds good, risks of undue prejudice threaten. Some courts, very
likely with these latter risks particularly in mind, have to a perceptible
extent refused this variety of implied admissions general substantive
value, but have granted limited value in confirmation of other evidence.
The available material is not yet adequate to determine the merits of this
restriction.
Since experimentation must continue, we hope that it will become
more conscious and less instinctive, and that consciousness will include
a wider appreciation of possible controlling devices, especially the con-
trol of comment by counsel. Sometimes implied admissions arise auto-
matically and without any offer of special evidence. Here our stock
example is the failure of a criminal defendant to testify when the prose-
cution has raised issues of fact on which he has personal knowledge.
This kind of thing bids fair to become increasingly important in view of
the modern tendency to strip away the customary legislative "no com-
ment or inference" provisions. The needed protection is against unjust
argumentative exploitation of the accused's silence. One form of pro-
tection is to forbid comment, although not forbidding inference. Such
was the Connecticut rule prior to 1879.1 The English rule02 and the
present Connecticut rule forbidding comment by the prosecutor but per-
mitting comment by the court seem potentially wiser. Fair explanation
from an impartial and experienced source ought to produce better results
than the unguided speculations of laymen.
When there must be special evidence of obstructive conduct to lay
the foundation for an implied admission, the best safeguard against bad
logic or undue prejudice is found in careful scrutiny of the evidence be-
fore it is put to the jury. The principal logical risk arises from what we
have called ambiguity of inference. It should be practicable for the
courts on this point to enunciate definite tests, either generally or with
respect to particularly difficult categories of cases. One obvious test
would be that evidence of obstructive conduct shall not be admitted un-
less it appears to the judge sufficiently complete-to have sufficient back-
ground or setting-to enable reasonably intelligent jurors to make an
effective appraisal, that is, to decide not by mere guess but by sober
91. State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 AtI. 181, 94 A. L. R. 696 (1934).
92. Reg. v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q. B. 77, 83.
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consideration of all the circumstances if the hostile inference desired
by the offering party may wisely and justly be drawnY3 Another test
giving the judge a greater degree of control would call upon him to
exclude the evidence unless he is able to make a preliminary finding that
the hostile inference desired is the most reasonable conclusion to be
drawn from the evidentiary showing. Such finding should not, of course,
be binding upon the jury. 4 Risks of undue prejudice must perhaps be
dealt with more flexibly, but it is easily conceivable that here, too, cer-
taii defined practices requiring unusually positive proof would be desir-
able.93 Beyond these general suggestions the authorities do not lead us.
Continued obscurity in our field of study betokens multifarious diffi-
culties which cannot be appreciated, let alone cleared away, unless prac-
titioners and judges give them patient and open-minded consideration.
93. State v. Weber, 272 Mo. 475, 199 S. W. 147 (1917), refuses to permit at tria
the drawing of an inference from a claim of privilege at the preliminary hearing. It
would have been hard for the trial jury to appraise intelligently such an incident when
they did not see it. But the opinion does not suggest this explanation of the result, and
cites as analogous, a case in which the claims of privilege were made at the trial itself.
94. Normally, as is commonly recognized, if the admission of evidence is challenged
only upon the issue of relevancy, the judge will let it in if a sufficient showing of relevance
be made to sustain a favorable finding by reasonable men. See generally Maguire and
Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence (1927)
40 HAnv. Lq Rxv. 392, which is effectively criticised by Morgan, Functions of Judge and
Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact (1929) 43 id. at 16S. But
considerations of practical policy permit stricter tests in appropriate cases. University of
Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N. H. 163, 51 Atl. 731, 62 L. R. A. 817 (1901) (authentication of
handwriting standards).
95. Cf. State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 136 S. W. 316, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 191 (1910),
evidence of other crimes to prove intent, etc.
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